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51. INTRODUCTION
The increasing reliance of the Community legislator on private
standard-setting organisations poses a set of classic constitutional
difficulties conveniently summed up in the catch-phrase
‘delegation of regulatory competencies’. Legal debate
surrounding the ‘New Approach to Technical Harmonisation and
Standards’ employs the concept to describe and denounce the use
of industrial self-regulation as an erosion of Member States’
power to further social objectives of health and safety in favour
of a deregulatory move by Community institutions sacrificing
social objectives to the greater good of market building. This
contribution sets out to demonstrate the inadequacy of this view.
We believe that the world of thought lying behind ‘delegation’
both represents a distorted perception of constitutional problems
along neat public/private and Community/Member State
dichotomies and prescribes a misconceived solution to these
problems – a reinvigoration of the public on the Community
level. ‘Delegation’ does not, and cannot, take account of the
specific problems posed by the inclusion of transnational private
actors in the regulation of the internal market, nor can it respond
in any meaningful way to the challenges posed by the
globalisation of private governance structures.
6While challenging the traditional perception, we insist on the
constitutional importance of the governance structures
established by standardisation. It is our contention that the
function of ‘Law’ should be not so much the allocation of formal
responsibility for decisions as it should be to structure the
process of decision-making with a view to further procedural
legitimacy. Our reinterpretation of the delegation issue will refer,
analytically, to the multi-level governance approach to the study
of European integration and, normatively, to ‘deliberative’
theories of constitutional democracy. Our suggestions will be
based, first, on a reconstruction of different phases of
‘conventional’ perceptions of the problem in terms of ‘de-
regulation’ and ‘privatisation’. We will then deconstruct the
concept of ‘delegation’ and, finally, try to offer – tentatively – an
alternative outlook.
2. THE NEW APPROACH: ‘DELEGATION’ OR
‘INTERVENTIONISM’? ‘DEREGULATION’ OR RE-REGULATION?
2.1. In Search for a New Regulatory Strategy for the
Elimination of Technical Barriers to Trade
The construction of the Common Market has always been
recognised to imply the removal of barriers to trade constituted
7by innumerable amounts of technical product specifications
incorporated in Member States’ laws and administrative
provisions not covered by Article 28 EC (ex Article 30 EC). The
initial approach to regulate all product-specific details at the
highest political level in Community directives ran into visible
trouble soon after the adoption of the General Programme for the
elimination of technical barriers to trade in 1969,
1 whose aim to
relieve the burden on the Community’s legislative process failed
miserably. Over the years, Commission frustration with the
slowness of the European legislative process mounted. The
unanimity principle in Council decision-making coupled with the
high degree of detail of the technical provisions to be agreed
upon were seen as severely impeding efficient lawmaking.
2
Moreover, since technology moved faster than Council decision-
making, the technical specifications which were finally produced
were often obsolete by the time Directives were finally
promulgated.
The ‘New Approach’ of 1985 marked a new phase in the
establishment of the Internal Market. Led exclusively by
pragmatic considerations to accelerate legislative activity, the
launch of the New Approach meant a significant departure in
philosophy and legislative strategy for the Community, and has
                                                          
1
 OJ 1969 C 76/1.
2
 Cf e.g. J. Pelkmans, Opheffing van technische handelsbelemmeringen
8turned out to embody a genuinely innovative regulatory
technique. New Approach Directives cover entire sectors rather
than single products, and limit themselves to laying down rather
general ‘essential requirements’ of health and safety. The task of
harmonising technical specifications is now left to private
European standards associations. Products manufactured
according to these harmonised standards enjoy a ‘presumption of
conformity’ with the essential requirements.
The New Approach has proven an undeniable success in terms of
legislative output. Where, for example, it had taken six years
under the traditional approach to agree on the determination of
the permissible sound level of lawnmowers,
3
 under the New
Approach it only took 18 months to adopt a directive on
machinery.
4
 Other directives were adopted for sectors ranging
from construction products to telecommunications terminal
equipment.
5
                                                                                                                                                   
in de EG ( Pilot Study in opdracht van het UNO) (Den Haag, 1985).
3
 OJ 1984 L 300/171.
4
 Directive 89/392/EEC, OJ 1989 L 183/9, since amended. A
consolidated version is published as Directive 98/37/EC, OJ 1998 L 207/1.
5
 Directive 89/106/EEC, OJ 1989 L 40/12 and Directive 91/263/EEC,
OJ 1991 L 128/1. Further adopted under the New Approach are Directive
87/104/EEC (simple pressure vessels), OJ 1987 L 220/48, Directive
88/378/EEC (toys), OJ 1988 L 187/1, 98/336/EEC (electromagnetic
compatability), OJ 1989 L 139/19, Directive 89/686/EEC (personal
protective equipment), OJ 1989 L 399/18, Directive 90/384/EEC (non-
automatic weighing instruments), OJ 1990 L 189/1, Directive 90/385/EEC
(implantable medical devices), OJ 1990 L 189/17, Directive 90/396/EEC
9In terms of legitimacy, however, questions have been raised from
the very outset about the system’s admissibility under
Community law. From its beginnings as an ad hoc trovata to
speed up the process of internal market building, the history of
the New Approach can be described as the Commission’s
continuous balancing act between accusations of ‘deregulation’
on the part of legal commentators and accusations of
‘interventionism’ on the part of the standardisation community.
6
                                                                                                                                                   
(gas burners), OJ 1990 L 196/15, Directive 92/42/EEC (hot-water boilers),
OJ 1992 L 167/17, Directive 93/15/EEC (explosives for civil uses) OJ 1993
L 121/20, Directive 93/42/EEC (medical devices), OJ 1993 L 169/1,
Directive 93/97/EEC (satellite earth equipment), OJ 1993 L 290/1 (amended
together with Directive 91/263/EEC by Directive 98/13/EC, OJ 1998 L
74/1), Directive 94/9/EC (equipment and protective systems intended for
use in potentially explosive atmospheres), OJ 1994 L 100/1, Directive
94/25/EC (recreational craft), OJ 1994 L 164/15, Directive 95/16/EC (lifts),
OJ 1995 L 213/1, Directive 97/23/EC (pressure equipment), OJ 1997 L
181/1, and Directive 98/79/EC (in vitro diagnostic medical devices), OJ
1998 L 331/1.
6
 The complete storyline of the ‘New Approach’, running through
Cassis de Dijon, the White Paper and ‘1992’, is found in Ch. Joerges, J.
Falke, H.-W. Micklitz, and G. Brüggemeier, Die Sicherheit von
Konsumgütern und die Entwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft
(Baden-Baden 1988) (English version: European Product Safety, Internal
Market Policy and the New Approach to Technical Harmonisation and
Standards, published as EUI Working Papers LAW, nos. 91/10-14,
Florence, 1991; http://www.iue.it/LAW/WP-Texts/Joerges91/). More recent
accounts, from different perspectives, are Falke, ‘Achievements and
Unresolved Problems of European Standardisation: The Ingenuity of
Practice and the Queries of Lawyers’ in Ch. Joerges, K.-H. Ladeur & E. Vos
(eds.), Integrating Scientific Expertise into Regulatory Decision-Making-
National Traditions and European Innovations (Baden-Baden 1997), 187-
224; K.A. Armstrong and S.J. Bulmer, The Governance of the Single
Market (Manchester 1998), 144 ff. and E. Vos, Institutional Frameworks of
Community Health and Safety Regulation. Committees, Agencies and
10
2.2. From the Low Voltage Directive to the New Approach –
From Original Sin to Innovative Regulatory Technique
The technique of referring to standards was pioneered by the
Low Voltage Directive of 1973.
7
 For a long time the Directive
was considered by Commission officials and national
administrations alike as an original sin not to be repeated, only
explicable and defensible because of the peculiarities of the
electrotechnical sector and the strength of the standardisation
tradition in that sector. It was to gain something of a cult status
afterwards, being hailed as a courageously pioneering exercise in
new regulatory techniques.
8
 The Directive lays down the general
safety requirement of manufacture ‘in accordance with good
engineering practice in safety matters in force in the Community’
and declares products manufactured in accordance with standards
‘drawn up by common agreement’ between national standards
bodies to be in conformity with that requirement.
Especially in the German literature, various critiques of the
technique were put forward. Röhling, for instance, viewed that
this technique in substance came down to an inadmissible
delegation of powers on the following grounds: the legal safety
                                                                                                                                                   
Private Bodies (Oxford 1999), 251 ff.
7
 Directive 73/23/EEC, OJ 1973 L 77/29.
8
 Cf Ch. Joerges et al., above n. 6.
11
requirements are formulated in such vague terms as to give the
standards bodies the power to decide the levels of hazard the
public is exposed to. The standards bodies themselves are
dominated by business interests, which makes it unlikely that the
first, let alone the only thing on their agenda be safety. The
delegation of powers by the Council to private standards bodies
makes legislative control over these decisions all but impossible.
9
Even if the Court of Justice in Cremonini and Vrankovich
seemed to acknowledge without much ado the compatibility of
the arrangement with the Treaty,
10
 these are serious objections
which were to set the tone of legal debate for a decade to come.
Three separate threads of the delegation-criticism are thus sewn
together: first, the discretion left to private bodies by excessively
vague legislative requirements, second, the lack of public control
over these private bodies and third, the lack of internal
democracy within these bodies.
The institutional set-up of the New Approach in many ways
sought to counter these attacks. First, in 1983 the Council
                                                          
9
 E. Röhling, Übertriebliche technische Normen als nichttarifäre
Handelshemnisse im Gemeinsamen Markt (Köln/Berlin/Bonn/München
1972), at 114 ff. Cf E. Grabitz, Die Harmonisierung baurechtlicher
Vorschriften durch die Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Berlin 1980).
10 Case 815/79 Criminal proceedings against Gaetano Cremonini and
Maria Luisa Vrankovich [1980] ECR 3583. Cf Hartley, ‘Consumer Safety
and the Harmonisation of Technical Standards: the Low Voltage Directive’,
(1982) 7 ELR 55.
12
adopted the so-called Information Directive,
11
 which establishes
a notification procedure for national technical regulations and
standards. The Directive defined ‘standard’ as a technical
specification with which compliance is not compulsory, adopted
by a ‘recognised standardisation body’. The Directive further
annexed a list of recognised national standards bodies and
designated CEN and CENELEC as ‘European standards bodies’
responsible for the running of the information procedure.
12
 As a
                                                          
11
 Council Directive 83/189/EEC laying down a procedure for the
provisions of information in the field of technical standards and regulations,
OJ 1983 L 109/8, amended since. A ‘consolidated’ version was published as
Directive 98/34/EC, OJ 1998 L 204/37. Less than a month after adoption of
the consolidated version, the text was substantially amended by Directive
98/48/EC, OJ 1998 L 217/18, so as to include information society services.
Especially in the field of public – mandatory – technical regulations the
Directive is considered a great success. Cf Fronia and Casella, ‘La procédure
de contrôle des réglementations techniques prévue par la nouvelle directive
83/189/CEE’, (1995) Revue du Marché Unique Européen, (2): 37-85;
Weatherill, Compulsory Notification of Draft Technical Regulations: The
Contribution of Directive 83/189 to the Management of the Internal market’,
(1996) 16 YEL 129. The importance of the directive is bound to grow by the
Court’s decision to render the obligation to notify draft technical regulations
directly effective. Case C-194/94 Securitel [1996] ECR I-2230. See e.g. the
casenotes by Everling, (1996) 23 ZLR 449, and Slot, (1996) 33 CMLR 1035;
and further López Escudero, ‘Efectos del incumplimiento del procedimiento
de información aplicable a las reglementaciones técnicas’, (1996) 23 Revista
de Instituciones Europeas 839, and Lecrenier, ‘Le contrôle des règles
techniques des Etats et la sauvegarde des droits des particuliers’, (1997) 5
Journal des Tribunaux- Droit européen 1.
12
 ETSI, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute, was set
up in 1986 but was not recognised as a ‘European Standardisation Body’
until 1992 in Commission Decision 92/400, OJ 1992 L 221/55.
13
next step, the Commission signed an agreement with CEN and
CENELEC in 1984.
13
In these ‘General guidelines for co-operation’, the Commission
confers what amounts to a monopoly of standard-setting on CEN
and CENELEC and commits itself to financial assistance. CEN
and CENELEC for their part commit themselves to draw up
standards according to Commission mandates and satisfying the
‘essential requirements’ of safety and health, and to ‘ensure’ the
‘effective association’ of all interested circles in the process.
The ‘New Approach’ itself, then, was launched by a 1985
Council Resolution.
14
 Annexed to that Resolution, a ‘Model
Directive’ was published in which the four fundamental
principles of the New Approach are laid down: legislative
harmonisation is to be limited to ‘essential safety requirements’;
the task of drawing up technical specifications is left to the
European standards bodies; these specifications are to maintain
their status of voluntary standards, but, at the same time, national
authorities are obliged to recognise that products manufactured in
accordance with these harmonised standards are presumed to
                                                          
13
 The document is published as CEN/CENELEC Memorandum 4. It
can also be found in (1985) 64 DIN-Mitteilungen 78-79 and as Appendix 4
in F. Nicolas, Common standards for enterprises (Luxembourg 1994).
14
 Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a new approach to technical
harmonization and standards, OJ 1985 C 136/1.
14
conform to the ‘essential requirements’. This set-up would make
it possible
‘to settle at a stroke, with the adoption of a single Directive, all the
problems concerning regulations for a very large number of products,
without the need for frequent amendments or adaptations to that
Directive’.
Further, two complementary strategies are put forward to address
the delegation issue. As far as the standards themselves are
concerned, their quality is to be ensured by ‘standardisation
mandates’ conferred by the Commission on CEN and
CENELEC. Moreover, a safeguard procedure is to be put in place
in each Directive allowing Member States the possibility to
contest the conformity of a product or the quality of a standard.
As far as the drafting of the ‘essential requirements’ is
concerned, the Model Directive insists that they be ‘worded
precisely enough in order to create, on transposition into national
law, legally binding obligations which can be enforced’.
2.3. Legal Debate on the New Approach
Even if the New Approach was generally welcomed in the
literature,
15
 for some it still entailed a wholesale delegation of
                                                          
15
 Most enthusiastically Pelkmans, ‘The New Approach to Technical
15
public regulatory competences to private industry-dominated
bodies. For German authors, general references to standards are
unconstitutional under German law.
16
 In the Community context,
the obligatory reference is to the European Court of Justice’s
case-law in Meroni,
17
 which would allow for some degree of
delegation, but under restricted conditions. Although the Meroni
judgments related to the ECSC, their validity for the EC Treaty is
generally accepted.18 In accordance with this case-law the
following conditions would apply for the admissibility of the
                                                                                                                                                   
Harmonisation and Standardisation’, (1987) 25 JCMS 249. With more
reservations, Bruha, ‘Rechtsangleichung in der Europäischen
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft- Deregulierung durch “Neue Strategie”?’, (1986)
46 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht 1, and Falke,
‘Normungspolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaften zum Schutz von
Verbrauchern und Arbeitnehmern’, (1989) 3 Jahrbuch zur Staats- und
Verwaltungswissenschaft 217. Cf Waelbroeck, ‘L’harmonisation des règles
et normes techniques dans la CEE’, (1988) 24 CDE 243; Burrows,
‘Harmonisation of Technical Standards: Reculer Pour Mieux Sauter?’,
(1990) 54 MLR 597, and Schreiber, ‘The New Approach to Technical
Harmonisation and Standards’, in L. Hurwitz & Ch. Lequesne (eds.), The
State of the European Community: Policies, Institutions and Debates in the
Transition Years (Boulder 1991), 99.
16
 The locus classicus for German law is P. Marburger, Die Regeln der
Technik im Recht (Köln 1979). See further e.g. Breuer, ‘Die internationale
Orientierung von Umwelt- und Technikstandards im deutschen und
europäischen Recht’, (1989) 9 Jahrbuch des Umwelt- und Technikrechts 43;
E. Denninger, Verfassungsrechtliche Anforderungen an die Normsetzung im
Umwelt- und Technikrecht (Baden-Baden 1990), and exhaustively J. Falke,
Rechtliche Aspekte der technischen Normung in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland (Habilitationsschrift) (Bremen 1999).
17 Case 9/56, Meroni & Co. Industrie Metallurgiche S.p.A. v High
Authority of the ECSC [1958] ECR 133, Case 10/56, Meroni & Co.
Industrie Metallurgiche S.p.A. v High Authority of the ECSC [1958] ECR
157.
18 Cf for example, Lenaerts, ‘Regulating the regulatory process:
‘delegation of powers’ in the European Community’, (1993) 18 ELR 41.
16
transfer of sovereign powers to subordinate authorities outside of
the EC institutions:
– the Commission cannot delegate broader powers than it
enjoys itself;
– only strictly executive powers may be delegated;
– no discretionary powers may be delegated;
– the exercise of delegated powers cannot be exempted from the
conditions to which they would have been subject if they had
been directly exercised by the Commission, in particular the
obligation to state reasons and judicial control of decisions;
– the delegated powers remain subject to conditions determined
by the Commission and subject to its continuing oversight;
– and, the ‘institutional balance’ between the EC institutions
must not be distorted.
The New Approach has been considered to fall short of these
conditions for lawful delegation. Since compliance with
harmonised standards grants a right to free movement, a
delegation of powers by the Council to the private
standardisation bodies is involved. This delegation would, then,
not be in accordance with the Meroni case law since it fails to
fulfil the requirement of judicial control. Since standards are not
17
an integral part of the Directives, they cannot be subject of an
appeal for annulment nor the subject of a preliminary ruling.
19
2.4. Europeanisation ‘From Above’: the 1990 Green Paper
The Commission’s 1990 Green Paper
20
 can be understood as an
effort to address the delegation problem from another angle, this
time concentrating on the status of the European standards
bodies. The masterplan was to increase both effectiveness and
legitimacy by imposing a fully-fledged ‘Europeanised’
institutional superstructure on (top) of the standard-producing
community.
One of the major practical early problems the New Approach
faced was the lack of standards produced to make the Directives
operative. The Commission’s frustration with its own lack of
means to incite or force CEN and CENELEC to speed up the
process led it to table a whole set of proposals ranging from new
working methods and increased use of information technology to
increased recourse to voting instead of the all-pervasive search
                                                          
19
 Cf Lauwaars, ‘The “Model Directive” on Technical Harmonization’,
in R. Bieber, R. Dehousse, J. Pinder & J. H.H. Weiler (eds.), 1992: One
Internal Market? A Critical Analysis of the Commission’s Internal Market
Strategy (Baden-Baden 1988), 151.
20
 ‘Green Paper on the Development of European Standardisation:
Action for Faster Technological Integration in Europe’, COM(90) 456 final.
18
for consensus so characteristic for standardisation. It further
called for increased participation and financial commitment from
European industry as well as more effective association of
consumer groups and other ‘interested circles’ virtually blocked
out of the process.
In addition the Commission suggested to create a European
Standardisation System which would clearly define the role of all
the participants at national level and European level in terms of
agreed objectives and allow for greater transparency and
participation of all interested circles. This system would allow
for both the diversity of organisation and the autonomy of
management within spectrally-based standardisation and also
ensure the co-ordination, transparency and legitimacy of
European standardisation by applying common rules to all
standardisation bodies within this System. These rules would
have to be developed by a European Standardisation Council.
This body should provide the overall policy of European
standardisation activities and be composed of representatives of
industry, consumers, users, trade unions, the Commission and the
EFTA secretariat. The composition of this body displays the
Community concern for the need to include the participation of
all the relevant interests. In addition to this body, a European
Standardisation Board – the executive body of the
Standardisation Council – would strengthen co-ordination
19
between the standardisation bodies. It would be composed of the
officers of the European standardisation bodies and the secretary
of the Standardisation Council. The European standardisation
bodies would enjoy complete autonomy in the programming,
financing, preparation and adoption of European standards,
which would be subject to compliance with the rules of the
European Standardisation System.
In the Commission’s view, this System would have the benefit of
increasing flexibility by providing additional sectoral
organisations where industrial sectors feel the need for greater
autonomy. Accordingly, the pace of production of standards
would be increased since European industry would participate as
associated bodies and so offer their services and expertise.
Increased participation of European industry would likewise ease
concerns about the long term financial stability of European
standardisation, in view of the growing dependence of the
standardisation bodies on public money. The Commission
proposed to require the members of the European standardisation
bodies to long-term financial commitment; to change the present
retribution of revenue from the sales and to institute member fees
for industry, participating in European standardisation (as
associated bodies).
20
2.5. Political Resistance ‘From Below’
Unsurprisingly, the Green Paper was ill-received both by
industry, called upon to contribute money and expertise, and
standardisation bodies, called upon to relinquish much of their
power in favour of a new layer of Euro-bureaucracy and the
Commission. The Commission, it was argued, had launched a
‘retrograde’ step towards outdated dirigisme. As the title of an
interview published in Enjeux with the president of AFNOR
tellingly claimed: ‘Le livre vert, ou la nostalgie du
réglementaire’.
21
 Particularly the proposals to create new sectoral
standardisation organisations and new bureaucratic layers to
supervise the activities of the existing standardisation bodies
were strongly rejected by the European standardisation bodies.
Other criticisms concerned the Commission’s neglect of
international standardisation, its sole focus on EC mandated
standards, the misrepresentation of industrial involvement and
the misunderstanding of operating practices in standardisation.
22
The Commission’s proposals to accelerate the standardisation
process by focusing on qualified majority voting in technical
committees would, according to this criticism, completely ignore
the core principle of consensus, characteristic for the
                                                          
21
 Boulin, President of AFNOR, in (1991) 114 Enjeux.
22
 Cf J. Pelkmans and M. Egan, Fixing European Standards: Moving
beyond the Green Paper (CEPS Working Document No. 65) (Brussels 1992),
at 15-22.
21
standardisation process. ‘Le livre vert ignore l’essence même de
la normalisation’, an AFNOR official declared in Le Monde.
23
Not much more mercy was to be expected from national
administrations. The Dutch Interdepartmental Committee for
Standardisation dismissed the Commission’s proposals as
follows:
‘[t]he cure prescribed in this instance by the Commission seems, by
and large, to be worse than the ailment; the measures proposed are
indicative of an almost cavalier disregard of all interests other than the
Community’s and of an incomplete grasp of history; they choose the
wrong point of attack, they are complicated to implement and
contestable in terms of Community law; they reinforce protectionist
sentiments and, above all, are damaging to the credibility and
therefore to the usefulness of the standardisation process’.
24
It was clear that the Commission could not but retreat from its
proposals. Abandoning most of its proposals, the Commission
changed its tone considerably in its 1991 Follow-up
Communication,
25
 announcing its intention to:
                                                          
23
 Le Monde 27/2/1991, at 21.
24
 Position of the Dutch Interdepartmental Committee for
Standardisation and Certification (ICN) on the Commission Green Paper on
Standardisation, 1 May 1991, at 8.
25
 COM(91) 521 final.
22
‘assist and promote democratic self-management of standardisation by
indicating the changing political context in which European
standardisation takes place, the fundamental principles on which
standardisation should be based and the organisational changes which
may be needed to ensure that those principles are fully observed’.
26
Although the Commission dropped the idea of radical
institutional reform, it retained its idea of creating some kind of
institutional structure, a European Standardisation Forum, which
would comprise all interested parties and promote meaningful
discussions on European standardisation policies. Its design
would be similar to that of the proposed Standardisation Council,
although with an increased membership. This body would be
able to address any issue relevant to the ‘success’ of European
standardisation, such as the current activity of the European
standardisation bodies, the application of basic principles such as
openness, participation of interested parties by the
standardisation bodies, the relation between public authorities
and the standardisation bodies. Even if the conclusions of the
Forum could be presented in non-binding resolutions, they would
in all likelihood carry considerable weight in view of the fact that
the representatives of all interested parties would be on the
Forum.
                                                          
26
 Ibid., at 7.
23
Even this second more moderate attempt to reform the self-
regulatory process of standardisation was rejected by the
standardisation bodies at the Luxembourg conference in
December 1991.
27
 Consequently, the Council’s Resolution on the
role of European standardisation in the European Economy of 18
June 1992
28
 was conspicuously silent on any institutional reform
of the standardisation structure, although it generally endorsed
the principles set forth by the Commission in its Green Paper and
Follow-up.
Unabated by the beating it has taken in the debates following the
Green Paper, the Commission currently pushes through its
objective of speeding up the standard-setting process by
changing the structure of its financial support to CEN and
CENELEC. Gradually, it is cutting back on general lump-sum
subsidies and switching to project-based financing of specific
items. Furthermore, it has solidified its practice of attaching
‘experts’ to CEN with the task of controlling the compatibility of
standards with the essential requirements in the stage of
drafting.
29
 In 1995, the Commission issued its Communication on
the Broader use of Standardisation in Community Policy, where
                                                          
27
 Cf J. Pelkmans and M. Egan, above, n. 22, at 14.
28
 OJ 1992 C 173/1.
29
 These experts are appointed in agreement with the Commission on
proposal of CEN. They are subordinated to the CEN administrative
hierarchy with the possibility of direct contact with relevant Commission
24
it announced its plans to extend the use of standardisation to
other areas, including biotechnology, environmental policy and
telecommunications services in the ambit of the ambitious
‘Information Society’ programme.
30
Political debate on the European level concerning standards is
still preoccupied with the perceived lack of efficiency of the
process. At the February 1998 Cambridge Meeting of Internal
Market Ministers the question was brought up again. From
several sides the unfortunate idea of ‘introducing’ majority
voting in CEN and CENELEC made a startling come-back,
coupled with suggestions to open up the system and strive
towards competition between European and national standards
bodies.
31
 The Council asked the Commission to draw up a report,
the publication of which has sparked off another round of
debate.
32
                                                                                                                                                   
services.
30
 COM(95) 412 final.
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 The minutes of the meeting as distributed by the Secretariat General,
SI (98) 114.
32
 Efficiency and Accountability in European Standardisation under the
New Approach- Report from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament, SEC (98) 291 CEN’s prompt reply ‘Efficiency of
European Standardisation’ is published in (1998) 77 DIN Mitteilungen. 656.
25
2.6. Renewed Legal Debate on ‘Delegation’
Legal debate will not leave the issue of unlawful delegation in
peace.
33
 Ernesto Previdi, closely involved with the New
Approach during his career in the Commission, speaks, after his
retirement, of the ‘astonishing’ delegation of regulatory decision-
making powers to private-law bodies ‘completely outside of the
institutional processes laid down in the EU Treaty, with no
institutional link or framework ever having been laid down for
them’.
34
 His proposal is to set up a regulatory Agency
accompanied by a hierarchy of norms in Community law.
Breulmann, for whom even the Meroni doctrine goes too far,
calls for formal reception of European standards in the
Community legal order by a Council act under Article 202 (3)
EC (ex Article 145 (3) EC) delegating implementation powers to
the Commission, and a Commission decision directed at all the
Member States announcing the presumption of conformity with
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 Previdi, ‘The Organization of Public and Private Responsibilities in
European Risk Regulation: An Institutional Gap Between Them?’, in Ch.
Joerges, K.-H. Ladeur and E. Vos (eds.), above, n. 6, 225 at 236. To be fair,
his strongest language refers to the Construction Directive.
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the requirements set by the directives.
35
 To call this arrangement
formalistic, according to him, is to confuse formalism with
Rechtsstaatlichkeit.
36
The debates thus far seem to have reached a dead end: on the one
hand, the functioning of the Internal Market is recognised to
depend largely on the self-regulatory structure of private
standards-setting; on the other hand, the regulatory framework
governing them is widely perceived as anarchic, unprincipled and
ill-fitted with the Community legal order.
3. RESTATING THE PROBLEM: ‘DELEGATION’ REVISITED
The anti-delegation doctrine is instructive because it highlights
two major conceptual difficulties ‘the law’ has with standard-
setting specifically, and with transnational governance generally.
Both stem from a vision of the public sphere deeply imprinted
with the memory of statehood. First, there is an underlying
assumption of a tidy hierarchical and territorial frame of law and
private rulemaking. Second, there is an underlying assumption
that the ‘public interest’ can be served only in hierarchical
legitimisation structures. We hope that a deconstruction of the
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 G. Breulmann, Normung und Rechtsangleichung in der Europäischen
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Berlin, 1993, 262 ff.
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 Ibid., 277.
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doctrine might prove insightful for a new outlook. What we
argue is that the problem should not be approached as
‘privatisation’ of public lawmaking and the solution not to be
searched for in a reinvigoration of the public. We should view the
problem as political instrumentalisation of private rulemaking,
and concentrate on efforts to render the private more public
regarding, to invent mechanisms for publicly responsible self-
regulation.
3.1. Breaking the Frame of Public Law and Private Rule-making
37
The anti-delegation doctrine presupposes that standards-setting is
inherently a public activity in need of hierarchical legitimation.
The imagery behind it is that the Community in the ‘New
Approach’ sub-contracts the very same activity it carried out
itself in the ‘old approach’. Private rulemaking, then, is seen as
just a way to overcome the unfortunate disadvantages of the
process of political decision-making. In this way of thinking,
‘standards’ need to be ‘brought back’ into the public sphere by
subordination in a legal hierarchy of norms, and thus be
legitimised by ‘higher’ law. In Community law ‘technical
regulations’ are distinguished from ‘standards’ by two defining
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 The terminology is borrowed from Teubner, ‘Breaking Frames: The
Global Interplay of Legal and Social Systems’, (1997) 45 American Journal
of Comparative Law 149.
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elements. One sees to normative strength and distinguishes
binding technical regulations from voluntary standards. The other
sees to the source, and distinguishes parliamentary lawmaking
from private – if ‘recognised’ – standard-setting.
38
 Even here, the
leitmotiv is functional equivalence. The objective seems clearly
to be the substitution of detailed public technical regulations with
standards, seen as an alternative to regulation.
39
Yet, standards differ from law in more fundamental ways. One
need not adhere to post-modern theories of regulatory law to
understand that ‘law’ is not an adequate institution to set
technical specifications that are dynamic enough to adapt to,
rather than block, technological change, and flexible enough to
open, rather than close off, markets. Standards depend on market
mechanisms to be accepted, rather than on the threat of sanction.
Standards are produced in consensus of market players, not with
the backing of political majority will. Standards operate on the
assumption that quality, and high levels of safety, are a
marketing argument rather than an imposed obligation. Perhaps
most importantly, standards bodies draw from a pool of relevant
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 Article 1, Directive 83/189/EEC OJ 1983 L 109/8.
39
 In the name of subsidiarity, for example. See Commission
Communication on the Broader Use of Standardisation in Community
Policy, above n. 30, at 4. On the growing importance of corporatist self-
regulation under the shadow of subsidiarity, see Scharpf, ‘Community and
Autonomy. Multi-Level Policy-Making in the European Community’,
(1994) 1 JEPP 219.
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knowledge and expertise that lawmakers can only dream of. It is
in this sense that the Commission praises standardisation for
‘combining the advantages of democracy with the ability to
reflect the technological state of the art’.
40
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the interface
between technology and regulation is shifted as a whole onto the
European level. Technological and economic reason travels faster
than regulatory cultures. In fact, how standards are incorporated
in the body of law, and hence technical and economic rationality
in public normative frames is highly dependent on peculiarities
of scientific, administrative, and legal cultures.
41
 In the United
States, with its long, although contested, tradition of regulatory
agencies, public and private standard-setters compete with one
another.
42
 In France, with its strong statist tradition featuring the
ideology of ‘service public’, standards are ‘homologated’ by
public authorities and incorporated in the body of administrative
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 Jasanoff, ‘American Exceptionalism and the Political
Acknowledgement of Risk’, (1990) 199 Daedalus 61, explains the differences
between US and European risk regulation in large part by differences in
scientific culture.
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Salter, Mandated Science: Science and Scientists in the Making of Standards
(Dordrecht/Boston/London 1988), and S. Krislov, How Nations Choose
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law.
43
 Generally, law incorporates technological reason by open
‘rules of recognition’ such as ‘the state of the art’, and ‘règles de
savoir faire’. Especially in Germany, which has perhaps the
strongest tradition of private standards-setting, this has led to a
highly refined and differentiated corpus of ‘hinge clauses’.
44
German legal authors, however, are the first to warn that such a
system is only possible in a coherent legal cultural system with
common normative frameworks.
45
 However, standards-setting,
under pressure of Community policy, is growing more and more
into an autonomous private activity throughout Europe. Several
southern Member States where standards-setting used to be a
public activity have now ‘privatised’ their standards bodies.
46
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 Portugal, Spain, and Greece. Cf H. Schepel and J. Falke, Legal
Aspects of Standardisation in the Member States of the EC and of EFTA,
forthcoming. For a discussion of small countries’ reactions to the European
standardisation system, see Bundgaard-Pedersen, ‘States and EU technical
standardisation: Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway managing polycentric
policy-making 1985-95’, (1997) 4 JEPP 206.
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The importance of national standards bodies has grown
tremendously as a result of Community standards policy.
47
‘European’ standards are now being imported into national
regulatory frameworks by their transposition as national
standards. These standards, it is argued, fall outside of time-
honoured cultural frames holding together technology and
regulation. The challenge for European law is, then, to provide
those public normative frameworks on Community level in
which to embed the Europeanisation of private technical
normative ordering.
‘Rule-making by “private governments” is subjugated under the
hierarchical frame of the national constitution that represents the
historical unity of law and state’, writes Gunther Teubner. But
now this frame has been broken:
‘What is new is not that private governments produce their own laws.
Rather it is that they evade the regulatory claims of national and
international law and practice a legal sovereignty of their own’.
48
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Looked at it this way, we could turn the story around: it is not so
much that the Commission has abdicated public powers in favour
of private bodies: the European legislator has intruded into fields
of private governance and lifted these structures from their
regulatory cultures. To be sure, the severance of ‘law’ and
‘technology’ is not due to autonomous functional differentiation,
but is, rather, politically generated and purposefully sustained.
Florence Nicolas of AFNOR describes the New Approach as
‘making it possible better to distinguish between those aspects of
Community harmonisation activities which fall in the province of
technology and those which fall within the province of technology,
and to differentiate between matters which fall within the competence
of public authorities and those which are the responsibility of
manufacturers and importers’.
49
It is submitted here that the New Approach has actually redrawn
the boundaries between law and technology. The autonomy of
standard-setting in Europe has now gone so far as to make it
impossible adequately to incorporate technological rationality
into law. Perhaps the better strategy is then to concentrate on
mechanisms and procedures that would ensure the incorporation
of public objectives into private rulemaking in decentralised
social systems.
50
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3.2. Breaking the Territorial Frame of Legal and Economic
Integration
Debates in European law often seem to assume that economic
integration stops at the borders of the European Union. It
assumes in the case of standardisation that it can co-ordinate
public and private systems of normative ordering within the neat
territorial frame of the European Union. The Green Paper was
attacked vigorously for ‘Fortress Europe’ visions of European
standardisation diverging from international standardisation
activities in ISO and IEC, especially from the United States. In
the Follow-up, the Commission stated that
‘where possible, the Community should have recourse to international
standards rather than devise standards at the regional level’.
It then spelled out the conditions under which this could happen:
the standards should be delivered within the time-scales imposed
by Community legislation, the European standards bodies are to
retain full contractual responsibility for delivery of the standards,
and the essential requirements are to be ‘taken fully into
account’.
51
                                                                                                                                                   
Legal Concept of the Network in European Standards-Setting’, in Ch.
Joerges and E. Vos (eds.), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and
Politics (Oxford 1999), 151 ff.
51
 Follow-up, above, n. 25, at 11. See also Communication on the
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The World Trade Organisation relies more and more on
standards in its efforts to open up world markets. The Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade obliges Members to use
international standards ‘as basis for their technical regulations’
except where these are an ‘ineffective or inappropriate means for
the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued’.
52
 Regulations
in accordance with international standards are presumed not to
create unnecessary obstacles to trade.
53
 Members shall take ‘such
reasonable measures as may be available to them’ to ensure that
standardisation bodies comply with the annexed Code of Good
Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of
Standards.
54
 The Code obliges standards bodies to use
international standards where they exist, except in certain
circumstances.
55
ISO and IEC are dominated by the European standards bodies
and their American counterparts as far as these are organised
through ANSI. CEN and ISO, as well as CENELEC and IEC,
have signed co-operation agreements which provides for
information procedures, avoidance of duplication, co-operation in
the drafting of standards by mutual representation in meetings of
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TC’s and the adoption of ISO standards as European standards.
56
The WTO’s co-optation of ISO puts severe constraints on the
ability of European standards to diverge from international
standards.
The co-ordination of private and public rulemaking on a global
level rehearses in several ways the same problems as it
encounters on European level.
57
 The WTO’s instrumentalisation
of standards for the exclusive purpose of market opening could
well conflict with the Community’s instrumentalisation of
standards for purposes of social regulation. Whereas national
regulatory law is under pressure from European standards,
Community regulatory law is under pressure from international
standards. The United States is deeply concerned, for example,
about the Council Regulation concerning a Community eco-
management and audit scheme,
58
 since it differs slightly but
significantly from the ISO 14000 series with which it is
somehow in competition.
59
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 CEN has recently published a ‘bridging document’ CEN CR 12969 to
explain the relationship between the two, ‘The use of EN ISO 14001, ISO
14010 and ISO 14012 for EMA related purposes’. Cf Köck,
‘Vollzugsaspekte des Öko-Audit Systems’, in N. Reich and R. Heine-
Mernik (eds.), Umweltverfassung und nachhaltige Entwicklung in der
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The territorial frames of private and public rulemaking are thus
diverging to the extent that it would be very difficult for the
Community to incorporate European standardisation
institutionally in its regulatory system without running into
political difficulties from its international trading partners.
However, the Community can exert its influence over
international standardisation via its contractual arrangements
with CEN to an extent its trading partners are unable to. The lack
of an institutional standards-monopoly in the United States
‘makes it very difficult for the United States to negotiate with
international standards bodies’.
60
3.3. Breaking the Frame of Constitutional Legitimacy
There is a seemingly strong appeal to democratic legitimacy in
the anti-delegation doctrine. Law is made by politically elected,
or at least publicly accountable, officials, and any delegation of
rulemaking power should be traceable, in the final analysis, to
that superior source of legitimacy. This must be the underlying
concern of Meroni’s prohibition for the Commission to delegate
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 Kendall, Current problems in technical standardisation, (1993) 3 EIU
European Trends 63. For a proposal for a ‘global constitution’ of
international product safety law, cf H.-W. Micklitz, Internationales
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more power than it has itself, and of its distinction between
‘clearly defined executive powers’ and ‘discretionary powers.’
The world is more complicated now than it was in 1958,
however. In Rubin’s words, the anti-delegation doctrine ‘engrafts
premodern notions of control and accountability onto the realities
of modern government’.
61
 Modern regulatory law, then,
emphasises procedural requirements of decision-making
processes rather than substantive legitimation through the legal
hierarchy of norms.
In European law, the two are conflated. An excursion into
Community anti-trust law will clarify the point. In its case-law on
anti-competitive State measures, the Court prohibits measures
that render EC competition law ‘ineffective’. The Court now
distinguishes two major kinds of state action that would qualify:
either the State ‘requires or favours’ concerted action or
‘reinforces their effects’; or it ‘deprives its own legislation of its
official character by delegating to private traders responsibility
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for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere’.
62
 Under the
first test, the Court scrutinises whether private decision-making
procedures are structured such that they yield ‘public interest’
measures, rather than being biased towards private interests.
Since the Reiff case of 1993, the Court has developed a
rudimentary set of procedural regulatory conditions for that
purpose. The transport tariff board in that case escaped
classification as a cartel because its members were to act as
‘independent experts’ not bound by orders or instructions from
the undertakings or associations which proposed them for
appointment to the Minister of Transport, and were called on by
law to fix the tariffs ‘on the basis of considerations of public
interest’.
63
 Subsequently, however, it applies the second,
‘delegation’ test, accumulatively, and insists on public
authorities’ final responsibility and discretion to substitute their
own decisions for those taken by the body in question.
64
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Reiff [1993] ECR I-5801. Contrast Case 123/83 BNIC v Clair [1985]. Reiff
is confirmed in Case C-153/93 Delta Schiffahrts- und Speditionsgesellschaft
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 It could well be argued that the Court insists on public responsibility
in these cases due to the rather flimsy ‘public interest’ quality the
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The two tests, however, correspond to fundamentally different
conceptions. The ‘delegation’ doctrine corresponds to the US
Supreme Court’s Midcal
65
 test and constitutes mere deference to
official authority. It is institutional, assuming that public
authorities have the ‘public interest’ at heart.
66
 The Supreme
Court has denied such antitrust immunity to standards bodies
notwithstanding their de facto quasi-legislative functions. In
Allied Tube it suggested that standard-setting could be safe from
antitrust scrutiny only if ‘private associations promulgate safety
standards based on the merits of objective expert judgements and
through procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from
being biased by members with economic interests in stifling
competition’.
67
 Such a procedural conception would be the way
forward to overcome the public/private divide in supranational
decision-making. Meroni and the ‘institutional balance of
powers’, it is submitted, are not the adequate instruments to do
that.
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4. REINTERPRETING EUROPEAN STANDARDISATION
Our paper could stop here with a summary of our analysis. We
have told the story of the New Approach as perceived by its
‘Eurocrat’ proponents, by the standard-setting community and by
legal commentators. We have contrasted the official presentation
and conventional perception with a different interpretation by a
deconstruction of the (anti-)delegation doctrine; the new
approach, we argued, was a re-regulatory move (like the internal
market programme as a whole
68
), an superimposition of the
Community’s policy objectives onto the formerly national and
international non-governmental spheres of standardisation, an
effort to substitute the nationally divergent relations between
standardisation and the public sphere by a pan-European policy
of market building. Applying the Meroni doctrine to
standardisation meant to establish a so far hardly visible new
authority. Similarly, the following efforts of the Commission to
reorganise and thereby to streamline European standardisation
were a complementary interventionist move by which the
Commission sought to compensate for the lack of own
infrastructures which the speeding up of its market building
objectives required.
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Our paper did not simply deconstruct prevailing interpretations
but also pointed to the resistance of the field. As has been
documented, the standardisation community has defended its
autonomy against the Community quite successfully. Equally
important, the critics of the Community’s interventionism could
rely on a so-to-speak natural ally; the promotion of standards of
regional validity seems out of step with the development and the
needs of the globalising economy.
There are, however, analytical premises and normative messages
underlying our story which we wish to make more explicit and
develop further. As announced in our introduction, we will
supplement our critique of the conventional (anti-)delegation
debate by some more constructive suggestions. Our argument
will proceed in three steps and try to respond to three
observations:
i) The first step concerns the ‘constitutional’ dimensions of
standardisation; although no public bureaucracy can and
should take over, standardisation cannot be left to the
expert standardisers.
ii) The interaction between standardisation bodies, national
administrators, European officials and the wider public and
the governance structures emerging from these interactions
42
do not fit into the institutional patterns foreseen within
national legal systems or the European treaties; legal
conceptualisations therefore have to redesign their
references to the European polity.
iii) Our third set of observations concerns the normative
importance of the links of standardisation with
Europeanisation and internationalisation. Here we will
distinguish between two aspects, namely: (a) the capacity
of constitutional states to impose regulatory concerns on
the standardisation praxis; (b) the capacity of national
policy makers to pursue industrial policy objectives and to
control distributional effects of standardisation. Our
general normative suggestions as to the functions of
standards and the institutional frameworks of
standardisation will aim at ensuring a deliberative quality
of decision-making processes rather than interest
representation and administrative control. This perspective
seeks to pay tribute to what has just been called the
‘constitutional’ dimension of standardisation. It does not
try to re-establish industrial policy potentials and does
hardly suffice to defend distributional concerns of nation
states. And it goes without saying that our ‘deliberative’
ideals are easier to pursue within the EU than at the
international level.
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None of these three issues will be dealt with comprehensively.
All we wish to document is that our so far quite deconstructive
argument can be constructively linked with current debates on
legitimate governance.
4.1. Standardisation and the Law: Some Constitutional Concerns
Standardisation has traditionally been organised by directly
interested actors. Only gradually and in very diverse ways
standardisation activities have been overshadowed by public law
or selectively and indirectly linked to regulatory concerns.
Suffice it here to point to issues such as the technological side of
safety at work law,
69
 and the efforts to include environmental
policy objectives in product standardisation.
70
 Standardisation,
one may conclude, is too important to leave it to the
standardisation community; it is too complex a mixture of
cognitive, normative and political aspects, one must add, to be
taken over by administrators.
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This conclusion is in principle uncontested.
71
 What remains
controversial is how to design adequate institutional responses to
these insights. We have hinted at our preferences: ‘reflexive’
mechanisms within standardisation procedures ensuring that
consumer concerns and environmental implications be taken into
account; no public control of standardisation as a matter of
routine but powers to intervene in emergency cases; independent
public information gathering; independence of the judiciary in its
assessment of safety requirements; certification as an incentive to
innovate. In somewhat abstract terms: ‘regulatory competition’
rather than uniformity; continuous critical discourses on the
social responsibility of standards rather than centralised
administrative prescriptions and controls. We refrain from
elaborating on these ideas for two reasons; first, their
‘implementation’ will have to vary according to national
institutional traditions and experiences; second, the design of an
ideal system would be pointless because the real world processes
of standardisation are characterised by simultaneous activities at
various levels and at all these levels the relationship between
standardisers and public officials and the broader public is
distinct. We therefore do not even try to suggest how
standardisation should be ideally embedded in the institutional
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framework of a constitutional (nation) state but move
immediately on to the European level.
4.2. Standardisation in the EU’s Multi-level System
The delegation versus non-delegation debate may be one of those
doctrinal exercises which seem to confirm widely shared
prejudices among social scientists (and even legal practitioners)
as to the (un-)seriousness of academic legal controversies. The
debate has had the merit, however, to make us aware of the
discrepancy between the institutional structures foreseen by the
framers of the European treaties (and national constitutions) on
the one hand and the actual functioning on the Union system on
the other. The vain efforts to bridge or camouflage these tensions
should not be taken lightly or belittled. The obstinacy of lawyers
in their search for an answer to the delegation problem and their
readiness to content themselves with overly formalistic responses
needs to be understood in the light of the difficulties of
developing alternatives. Our readiness to break so many frames
at once comes at a price, as will become immediately apparent.
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4.2.1. Analytical Advantages and Legal Difficulties
At the analytical side of our argument, the stakes are not too
high. All well-established legal conceptualisations of the
European Union presuppose the co-existence of constitutional
nation states with specific demoi populating their territories. It is
possible and elucidating to parallel the controversial legal
perceptions of the European construct with competing schools of
thought in political sciences; namely, intergovernmentalism on
the one hand and neo-functionalism on the other.
72
 It is equally
possible for lawyers to subscribe to the many arguments
suggesting that this once well-established dichotomy has to be
overcome and be substituted by the portrayal of the EU as a
‘multi-level system of governance’. Pertinent analyses highlight
the erosion of nation-states while denying their transformation
into a new European super state. The concept of governance used
is flexible enough both firmly to capture certain sui generis
characteristics of the emerging European polity such as its lack of
internal hierarchy and its reliance upon ‘Law’, and to leave open
the question of exactly where the European system lies on a scale
between the traditional nation-state and looser forms of
international co-operation.
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Rather than elaborate on this extremely brief sketch,
73
 however,
our use of aspects of the multi-level analysis might be better
explained in the light of the compatibility of ‘multi-levelism’
with three general features of the Europeanisation of
standardisation activities. First, the multi-level approach appears
to be perfectly compatible with the conservation and jealous
defence of ‘competencies’ at national level both of administrative
bodies and non-governmental organisations and the
superimposition of national by European systems of
standardisation and frameworks of economic and social
regulation. Secondly, this approach has the advantage of being
able to conceptualise ‘governance’ independent from or beyond
our formalised public/private and nation-state/Community
dichotomies, and likewise seems compatible with what we
‘know’ about the erosion of national sovereignty on the one hand
and the growth of regulatory powers at the European level on the
other. Thirdly, and most important for our argument, this
analytical framework allows the ‘imperfection’ of integration
processes to be articulated. We insist on using quotation marks
because we wish to underline that any effort to arrive at strictly
uniform regulatory practices within the EU would be
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inconceivable in view of both the economic disparities within the
EU and the political diversity of European societies; it would
hence even jeopardise the problem-solving capacities of Europe’s
sophisticated market management machinery.
The analytical adequacy of multi-level and network analyses
becomes even more apparent once one considers in more detail
the complex web of vertical, horizontal and diagonal interaction
patterns among European and national governmental and non-
governmental actors. Standardisation in general is structured in
line with the agreement of 1984 between the Commission and
CEN/CENELEC
74
 and seems thus to confirm the dominating role
of the European standardisation bodies with Commission acting
as an agenda setter whereas the representatives of the Member
States have, according to Directive 83/189,
75
 merely an advisory
role. This picture needs to be thoroughly refined, however. Not
only did the Commission manage to scrutinise standardisation
projects more or less intensively
76
 and make standardisers accept
participation of consumer organisations; important directives
provide for a continuous supervision of implementation
processes by regulatory committees, the members of which
communicate quite intensively with national administrative
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bodies and non-governmental organisations, especially trade
unions.
77
 It would therefore be too simplistic to focus exclusively
on the regular institutional patterns established by the New
Approach. These patterns have been supplemented and modified
with the intensified involvement of the Community at the
borderlines of standardisation and social regulation. And it is
important to note that the Community has a variety of options at
its disposal to pursue what it regards as an important ‘public’
concern. In the broad field of the Machinery Directive (i.e. at the
borderlines of standardisation, product regulation and safety at
work legislation) it has chosen to rely on well-established models
of co-operation of standardisers with specialised administrators
and experts from the trade unions. The level of safety consumers
are entitled to expect is not exclusively determined by
standardisers but also by administrative bodies and courts.
Environmental concerns are protected by a separate body of law.
Even if the integration of environmental concerns into
standardisation processes increases, this separate body of law can
always be revitalised. European standardisation thus does not
operate in a legal vacuum but is in varying intensity embedded
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into legal frameworks and constantly fed and controlled through
networks of non-governmental and governmental actors.
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us with criteria which would allow us to determine whether a
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standard is indispensable for establishing a market or meant to
impede potential competitors; neither is it necessarily to indicate
that antitrust law cannot provide us with valid distinctions
between true and false, legitimate and illegitimate ‘regulatory’
concerns of standardisation. Be all that as it may: In the
European and international arena, anti-competitive strategies of
powerful economic actors usually go hand in hand with
protectionist objectives of governments or pave the way for
industrial policies and some more or less intense ‘regulatory
competition’ among nation state based politico-industrial
compounds.
78
 We expect these dimensions to play an important
role in the adoption of standards. But we also assume an in-built
tendency of European standardisation bodies to reject within
their regional competence protectionist and one-sided industrial
policy objectives. We also expect international conflict
settlements to resort to criteria which relate to ‘legitimate’
regulatory concerns in order to avoid an involvement into
conflicts over economic interests.
4.3. Bringing the Law in
How do these observations and considerations relate to the legal
system in general and to the anti-delegation doctrine in
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particular? The following discussion will not deal with these
issues comprehensively but present a general normative
perspective, then suggest a legal classification of the type of
governance within which European standardisation operates and
finally indicate how the legal system should impose constraints
upon standardisation activities and seek to influence decision-
making.
4.3.1.  Deliberative Supranationalism
Even though our sketch of recent efforts in political sciences to
understand the ‘nature of the European beast’
79
 has been
extremely brief, one may conclude that a shift of paradigmatic
dimensions in the legal conceptualisation of European
governance is overdue. The ‘reality’ of standardisation activities
seems to confirm perfectly well the superiority of concepts such
as multi-level governance and network over conventional legal
conceptualisations of the European Community. This analytical
superiority, however, remains legally meaningless without a
concomitant normative reconstruction. Can the multi-level
approach be made compatible with any meaningful assignment
of competencies to national and European authorities? How
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could the Law ensure the functioning of a non-hierarchical
system of governance? What type of authority can be attributed
to ‘networks’? What kind of legitimacy would endorse their
governance? Is that legitimacy at all reconcilable with any
constitutional vision of democratic governance?
Even though we do not claim to dispose of ready-made answers
to all of these questions we feel entitled to advocate a normative
perspective which we have labelled ‘deliberative
supranationalism’ and developed somewhat more fully
elsewhere.
80
 The term denotes a constitutional perspective for the
European Union different on the one hand from orthodox
interpretations of the Community as a system integrated through
supranational law, but on the other hand also different from the
renewed downgrading of the Union to a mere alliance of states
(‘Staatenverbund’) and corresponding allusions to international
law principles. In terms of legal or constitutional theory, this is a
borrowing from theories of ‘deliberative’ democracy,
81
 according
to which the institutions of the democratic constitutional state
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have downright constitutive importance for the legitimacy of
modern law. Specifically from this theoretical perspective,
Europe’s much taunted ‘democratic deficit’ is in fact an objection
against the claims of European law to immediate validity and
primacy – and this objection only seems the stronger if it is
assumed that one cannot expect the European Union’s
transformation into a stale entity in the foreseeable future.
‘Deliberative Supranationalism’ hence designates a mode of legal
structuring of political processes that can be separated from the
model of the national constitutional state with comprehensive
tasks and powers and then offers a viable normative perspective
for the supranational legal links among the EU’s constitutional
states in general and the legal constitution of Community
political projects in particular. The specific feature of this view is
that it conceives of the ‘supranational’ law not as rules preceding
and overlying the national legal systems, but as deriving its
validity from the ‘deliberative’ quality of its production. To
simplify a longer argument: just because the Union cannot be
conceived of as a legal hierarchy (or expected to develop into a
state-like entity), the integrity of the integration process and of
the transnational governance structures it produces will depend
upon the taming of continuous bargaining and strategic interest
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formation, on the ‘deliberative quality’ of political processes
which must be ensured by Law.
4.3.2.  ‘Good Governance’ in the European Union
Standardisation, so we have noted more than once, relates to the
normative world of Law and to the distinct world of knowledge −
and it is due to this specific property that standardisation cannot
be left to the expert standardisers nor taken over by
administrative bodies or the political system. At a transnational
level, we have added, standardisation activities relate to industrial
policy objectives and affect the economic well-being of
economic sectors and whole regions. A label capturing this
mixture of private and public governance, of normative and
cognitive dimensions of decision-making, of transnational
problem-solving and intergovernmental plus inter-societal
bargaining over economic interests is yet to be found.
82
 We have
chosen the term ‘good governance’ to denote our analytical
premises and normative perspectives; standardisation is − public
and private − ‘governance’; it can neither be reduced to the
application of legal rules and principles nor to a purely
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technocratic exercise but requires political decisions over
normative issues and economic interests; and it is for exactly this
reason that standardisation needs legitimacy. The type of
legitimacy we envisage has already been indicated: ‘good
standardisation’ should result from the deliberative quality of
decision-making processes. This quality, we have argued, has to
be ensured by Law. But how?
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4.3.3. Constitutionalisation in Bits and Pieces
The juridification of standardisation in the EU will not be
brought about systematically. What we can observe already and
expect to occur more frequently in the future is the adoption of
legislative acts and the handing down of judgments which
address pertinent aspects of the standardisation compound. This
contribution can be expected to identify rules and principles with
the potential of furthering ‘deliberative’ decision-making. At the
end of an already overly lengthy argument, the presentation of a
list of legal considerations may suffice to comply with such
expectations:
A Standardisation Directive? Although the Community managed
to strengthen European standardisation, it did not overcome its
traditional infrastructures. In order to reduce the impact of the
principle of national representation and to strengthen the
implementation of European commitments, one could have
expected an effort to adopt a standardisation directive aiming at
some equivalence of standardisation procedures. Such an
initiative was never taken. There may be no practical need for it
because standardisers follow a surprisingly ‘harmonised’ set of
internal procedures as it is: decision-making by consensus, public
inquiry, obligations to deal somehow with comments received,
and arbitration mechanisms for dispute resolution form a kind of
58
rudimentary common ‘internal administrative law’. To be sure,
these mechanisms do not curb fears of bias towards certain
interests. However, perhaps
‘the greater danger is that government bureaucrats, intent on ensuring
that no consumer interest goes unsatisfied, will encumber a private
standards-writing process that has worked remarkably well with a set
of time-consuming, conflict-creating formal rules and adversarial
procedures that would reduce its essential advantage over government
regulation’.
83
It would have been useless because such a directive would not
cover the whole web of nationally divergent provisions relating
to standardisation.
Primary Law and Directive 83/189. Even without direct
interference by secondary law with national standardisation, the
factual impact of the European policies has been enormous and
the backing of this impact by Directive 83/189 and general
provisions of primary law considerable. Article 28 EC (ex Article
30 EC) together with the said Directive impose specific
‘rationalised’ regulatory structures on the whole field of product
regulation and by the same token discipline decision-making
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processes by discriminating between (illegitimate) protectionist
interests and (legitimate) regulatory concerns.
Surrounding Legal Structures. The New Approach’s opening up
of markets for products manufactured in accordance with
standards is accompanied by general Community product safety
law. The Directive on General Product Safety
84
 gives national
administrations considerable discretion to impose restrictions on
the placing on the market of products or even to withdraw them
if ‘there is evidence’ of danger notwithstanding conformity with
laws, regulations or standards. The Product Liability Directive
gives national courts even more leeway to consider for
themselves whether those products meet ‘legitimate consumer
expectations’,
85
 or whether the standards concerned correspond
to the ‘state of scientific and technical knowledge’ so that
producers can be granted ‘development risk’ exemption.
86
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 The ‘development risk’ exemption was no doubt intended to be
limited to the objective state of knowledge, not to the state of knowledge of
the manufacturer or to the possibility to know about the state of knowledge.
The Court of Justice has, however, lowered the threshold in that ‘it is
implicit (…) that the relevant scientific and technical knowledge must have
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The Legally Required Level of Expertise. Standardisation
requires expertise but the type of expertise needed varies with the
complexity of products and their inherent risks. In view of the
fact, however, that European standardisation is to comply with
binding safety requirements, standardisation organisations must
be expected to live up to legally prescribed levels. To cite a
seemingly far fetched example:
‘The drafting and adaptation of Community rules governing cosmetic
products are founded on scientific and technical assessments which
must themselves be based on the results of the latest international
research (...)’.
87
This standard is presented as an indispensable implication of the
kind of risks cosmetic products may present. Moreover, in
adopting this standard the ECJ implicitly disempowered two
Community institutions; neither the Commission nor the
‘Committee on the Adaptation to Technical Progress of the
Directives on the Removal of Technical Barriers to Trade in the
Cosmetic Products Sector’, which consists exclusively of
representatives of the Member States, is in a position to carry out
the type of assessment which, ‘in the nature of things and apart
from any provision laid down to that effect’ requires the
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assistance of ‘experts on scientific and technical issues delegated
by the Member States’.
88
 Is that too far-fetched an interpretation,
as Bradley argues?
89
 Even if this were so, decision-making
processes both at Community and national level will in
controversial cases de facto be forced to resort to the rationalising
power of high levels of expertise.
90
From Interest Representation to Participation in Deliberation.
One widespread reaction to the difficulties of representative
democracies to govern technical developments on the one hand
and the risk that interest groups capture self-regulatory bodies on
the other, is a quest for a broader societal representation of
‘interests’ within such bodies. We have discussed how the
Community has tried this way out. But how would one determine
the entitlement to represent ‘interests’ in Europe’s non-unitary
polity?
91
 And how could the transformation of such ‘interests’
into sound technical assessments be ensured? The key to ‘good
governance’ in the field of standardisation is not balanced
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interest representation but thorough deliberation. Under this
orientation, the internal and external principles and rules relating
to decision-making in European standardisation do indeed
convey legitimacy: legislative ‘essential safety requirements’
provide some guidance as to the priorities and normative
commitments of standardisation; the Commission is capable of
substantiating these prerogatives further in the mandates which
serve as a basis for specific standardisation projects; its ‘safety
consultants’ should in principle be able to ensure a continuous
information flow between the ‘private’ and ‘public’ European
spheres while the involvement of various DGs should ensure that
a broad range of regulatory concerns is taken into account; the
quality of standards can be supervised by many administrative
bodies and non-governmental actors throughout the EU; the
safeguard clauses of directives and the independence of the
administrative and judicial web of product safety laws bridge
standardisation and the public sphere not in a hierarchical sense
but through the potential to take action independently.
4.3.4. Intra EU Implications and Globalisation
Our focus on the deliberative quality of standardisation processes
and the ‘social responsibility’ (the level of user and
environmental safety) of standards seems to turn the European
project upside down. After all, it was not some pan-European
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concern for safety and the environment but the Community’s
market building initiative which motivated the Europeanisation
of standardisation, and it was an interest and belief in the
economic advantages of the bigger market which made European
governments accept the rules and institutions of the new internal
market. Our analysis does not deny the unifying force of
economic interests. What we assert is that standardisation does
not and should not operate in splendid social isolation, neither at
European level nor within the European nation states. A shift in
legal debates from concerns for uniformity of standards in the
European market to European-wide deliberation about their
quality should be understood as a tribute to the context within
which standardisation is to operate.
We have announced not to deal in any systematic way with
globalisation and we keep that promise. We would nevertheless
like to note that in our analytical and normative perspectives the
differences are a matter of degree, not of principle. Just like the
governance structures of European standardisation, the ‘regimes’
of international standardisation are guided by internal rules and
surrounded by legal systems. We would at least try to develop
strategies which use the dependence and embeddedness of
international standardisation as a chance to promote deliberative
decision-making processes.
